In 1977 the black-out was lifted. It was done by R. S. C., Ord. 53. The curtains were drawn back. The light was let in. Our administrative law became well-organised and comprehensive. It enabled the High Court to review the decisions of all inferior courts and tribunals and to quash them when they went wrong. And what is more, it enabled the High Court to award damages and grant declarations. No longer is it necessary to bring an ordinary action to obtain damages or declarations. It can all be done by judicial review. This new remedy (by judicial review) has made the old remedy (by action at law) superfluous.
The statute in section 3(1) contains a definition of a racial group”. It means a group of persons defined by reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins.” That definition is very carefully framed. Most interesting is that it does not include religion or politics or culture. You can discriminate for or against Roman Catholics as much as you like without being in breach of the law. You can discriminate for or against Communists as much as you please, without being in breach of the law. You can discriminate for or against the hippies” as much as you like, without being in breach of the law. But you must not discriminate against a man because of his colour or of his race or of his nationality, or of his ethnic or national origins.” … You must remember that it is perfectly lawful to discriminate against groups of people to whom you object — so long as they are not a racial group. You can discriminate against the Moonies or the Skinheads or any other group which you dislike or to which you take objection. No matter whether your objection to them is reasonable or unreasonable, you can discriminate against them — without being in breach of the law.’}}
At one time there was a black-out of any development of administrative law. The curtains were drawn across to prevent the light coming in. The remedy of certiorari was hedged about with all sorts of technical limitations. It did not give a remedy when inferior tribunals went wrong, but only when they went outside their jurisdiction altogether. The black-out started in 1841 with Reg. v. Bolton (1841) 1 Q. B. 66 and became darkest in 1922, Rex v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. [1922] 2 A. C. 128. It was not relieved until 1952, Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw [1952] 1 K. B. 338. Whilst the darkness still prevailed, we let in some light by means of a declaration. The most notable cases were Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 Q. B. 18 and Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 A. C. 147. I sat in the preliminary hearings of both of them. We allowed each of those cases to go forward. It was because otherwise persons would be without a remedy for an injustice: see Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 Q. B. 18, 43 and the Anisminic case [1969] 2 A. C. 147, 231B-C In effect it was only by leave that the action for a declaration was allowed to proceed.
Люди говорят, что я эксцентричен и слаб. Что ж, быть может, я слаб телом и туг на ухо, но я надеюсь, что мой разум так же бодр, как и всегда, и собираюсь высказывать то, что думаю, так же свободно, как и прежде. Я — простой человек, который говорит от лица всех простых людей Англии, и из получаемых мною писем видно, что подавляющее большинство согласно со мной.
"The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail— its roof may shake— the wind may blow through it— the storm may enter— the rain may enter— but the King of England cannot enter— all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement." So be it— unless he has justification by law.